The Shapley value for directed graph games


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KHMELNITSKAYA A., Selcuk O. , TALMAN D.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, cilt.44, ss.143-147, 2016 (SCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 44 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2016
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.009
  • Dergi Adı: OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.143-147

Özet

The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) TU games with limited cooperation induced by a digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players is introduced. It is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations which do not violate the induced subordination of players. We study properties of this solution and its core stability. For digraph games with the digraphs being directed cycles an axiomatization of the solution is obtained. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.