An Axiomatization of the Myerson Value

Selcuk Ö., Suzuki T.

7th International Conference on Game Theory and Management, St Petersburg, Russia, 26 - 28 June 2013, vol.7, pp.341-348 identifier

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Full Text
  • Volume: 7
  • City: St Petersburg
  • Country: Russia
  • Page Numbers: pp.341-348


TU-games with communication structure are cooperative games with transferable utility where the cooperation between players is limited by a communication structure represented by a graph on the set of players. On this class of games, the Myerson value is one of the most well-known solutions and it is the Shapley value of the so-called restricted game. In this study we give another form of fairness axiom on the class of TU-games with communication structure so that the Myerson value is uniquely characterized by this fainess axiom with (component) efficiency, a kind of null player property and additivity. The combination is similar to the original characterization of the Shapley value.